Secrets and credentials
Deploy tokens, cloud profiles, service-account passwords and API keys that are valid only at a decoy.
- /srv/ci/.env DEPLOY_TOKEN=…
- ~/.aws/credentials [billing-admin]
- secret/payments-db
FalseTrail places believable false opportunities where attackers explore: credentials, service references, connection paths, identities and machine-readable service and tool references. When one is pursued, you know exactly which placement was followed, and the attacker continues down a controlled path that leads nowhere real.It runs inside your environment, and your security stack stays in control.
Every move an attacker makes depends on what the environment reveals. FalseTrail adds a small number of opportunities that look exactly like the ones they are hunting for, and owns where each one leads.
Put believable false opportunities where attackers look: on endpoints, in CI, in clusters, in directories and docs. Use the deployment tools you already trust.
New placements start in Learning, then arm once they are clean.When a trail is followed, FalseTrail knows which placement it came from, where the interaction originated and how far it went.
Only things you placed can raise a finding.The attacker reaches controlled decoys that answer convincingly, and keeps spending actions on synthetic assets while your SOC responds.
Findings flow into the security stack you already run.Under the hood Place → Learn → Arm → Detect → Mislead → Alert
A credential is one kind of trail. So is a hostname in an SSH config, a registry in a build file or a tool in an agent's config. FalseTrail treats them all the same way: placed deliberately, unique to where they were placed, leading only into controlled decoy services.
Deploy tokens, cloud profiles, service-account passwords and API keys that are valid only at a decoy.
Internal URLs, API endpoints, SSH, RDP and SMB entries, and package registries that point at hosts you control.
Synthetic service accounts, groups, repositories, buckets and shares that look like the next step up.
Service descriptions, tool definitions and discovery files that agents parse and act on, in the formats your environment and your agents already use.
Hosts, APIs, file shares, secret stores and tool servers that answer the way the real thing would. They hold no real data, they are reachable only through the trails you placed, and they never call out of your network.
Not every interaction means the same thing. The further an attacker follows a false trail, the stronger the evidence, and every finding says how far they went.
A placement-specific reference was resolved or connected to.
A connection to db-replica-02, a host that exists only in one SSH config.
Tells youSomeone read a placed artifact and acted on it.
A synthetic credential or opportunity was actively used.
The deploy token from ci-runner-07 presented to the decoy auth service.
Tells youA secret nobody legitimate knows is in someone’s hands.
A stronger, privileged action was attempted inside the decoy.
Reading vault-legacy secrets, listing admin users, requesting a production export.
Tells youIntent: what they were after, in their own requests.
Offensive agents and attack automation don’t guess. They inventory the environment, parse what they find and pursue the most promising path. That discipline is exactly what FalseTrail is designed around.
Every host, file and config gets looked at, so a well-placed opportunity gets found.
A trail can be precise: one hostname, one key, one tool definition, unique to one placement.
Weeks of anomaly baselining is too slow. A followed trail is conclusive on first contact.
An agent has no way to check whether db-replica-02 is real. A coherent false path holds.
FalseTrail does not need to know whether the attacker is a model, a script or a person.Nobody legitimate follows a trail you placed. Human intruders trip the same wire. Autonomous ones just trip it sooner.
False opportunities are only useful if they are in the right places, stay believable and never get in the way. FalseTrail manages them as an inventory with a lifecycle, and deploys through mechanisms you already trust. No heavy agent on every endpoint.
| Opportunity | Type | Where | Group | State | Health |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| db-replica-02 | connection | dev-laptop-114 · ~/.ssh/config | Engineering laptops | armed | ok |
| DEPLOY_TOKEN | secret | ci-runner-07 · /srv/ci/.env | CI runners | armed | followed |
| billing-admin.int | service ref | wiki · Payments runbook | Internal docs | armed | ok |
| @acme/payments-sdk | package ref | build hosts · .npmrc | Build hosts | learning | ok |
| svc-backup-legacy | identity | directory · IT-Ops OU | Identity | armed | ok |
| ops-tools | agent tool | dev workstations · tool config | Dev workstations | learning | 1 benign |
| jump-01.rdp | connection | fs01 · \it share | File shares | retired | rotated |
| Target group | Deployed with | Packs | State |
|---|---|---|---|
| Engineering laptops | Intune | 3 packs | armed |
| CI runners | Ansible | 2 packs | armed |
| Build hosts | Ansible | 1 pack | learning |
| Kubernetes · payments | Helm | 2 packs | armed |
| Identity | GPO | 1 pack | armed |
| Severity | Strength | Placement | Source | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| high | Escalated | DEPLOY_TOKEN · ci-runner-07 | 10.20.4.31 | 14:02 |
| med | Followed | billing-admin.int · wiki | 10.20.4.31 | 13:58 |
| info | Benign · tester | svc-backup-legacy · directory | 10.99.0.12 | yesterday |
Every environment has scanners, DLP, EDR, backup and indexing jobs, CI automation and authorized testers. New placements start in a Learning state, so FalseTrail can see what legitimately touches them before they count.
Low-noise deception that gets more confident as it learns your environment.
Scoped to this placement, this source and its schedule. Expires in 90 days.
Recorded and labelled. Never silenced.
Real automation resolves this registry. Move or retire the placement before arming.
Learning never hides an interaction it cannot explain.
Placement state, synthetic secrets, environment metadata and attack evidence are exactly what you don’t want leaving your network. FalseTrail runs a customer-hosted control plane, so none of it has to.
Interactions are recorded, judged and turned into findings inside your boundary.
Production traffic never routes through FalseTrail. Only placed trails lead to it.
Decoys sit where you put them, behind your own TLS, and make no outbound calls.
Data centers, private cloud and mixed estates, deployed the way your environment is run.
No triage queue of anomalies. Each finding explains itself: what was followed, where it was planted, when, from where, and how far the attacker went on the false path.
A followed trail is evidence by construction. There is no model confidence to second-guess.
Related interactions on the false path are grouped into a timeline, so the analyst sees the sequence and not just the first touch.
Every finding points to the raw interactions it cites, kept append-only inside your environment.
FalseTrail is not another console to watch or another SIEM to feed. It creates high-confidence deception evidence and hands it, with context, to the tools and people already responsible for response.
FalseTrail produces placement bundles and policies. The tools that already have authority over your estate put them in place.
Findings arrive as structured events with stable IDs, ready for correlation and automated playbooks.
FalseTrail never blocks or isolates anything. Your EDR, XDR and SOAR keep the authority to act.
Inside your environment. The control plane, decoy services, evidence store and alerting are customer-hosted, on-prem, in private cloud or across a hybrid estate. Attack telemetry, deception state and sensitive environment context can stay entirely inside your network.
Credentials are one kind of trail. FalseTrail also places service references, connection entries, package references, synthetic identities and resources, and agent-facing tool definitions, and manages all of them as an inventory with a lifecycle.
No. Placements are files, entries and objects delivered by the mechanisms you already trust: Group Policy, Intune or MDM, Ansible, Kubernetes, your EDR or your infrastructure-as-code.
Touching a generic decoy never raises a finding. Placements start in Learning, where FalseTrail identifies legitimate automation and authorized testers and records them as narrow, expiring patterns. Interactions it cannot explain still alert.
No. A trail you placed has no legitimate follower, whoever follows it. FalseTrail is optimized for how autonomous attackers explore, but human intruders are caught the same way.
No. Production requests never route through FalseTrail. The only way to reach a decoy is to follow a trail you placed.
Once a trail is followed, the decoy answers convincingly and offers further synthetic opportunities, so the attacker’s next actions land on fake assets instead of real ones. It buys your team time and context. It does not guarantee containment, which stays with your response tools.
No. It feeds them. FalseTrail produces findings with context and leaves correlation, response and containment to the stack you already run.
We’ll walk through FalseTrail in a sample private environment: placing false opportunities across an estate, learning what is normal, and the finding your SOC receives when a trail is followed.